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In order to explain in a systematic way why certain combinations of market, nancial, and
legal structures may be intrinsic to certain capabilities to exchange real goods, we introduce
criteria for abstracting the qualitative functions of markets. The criteria involve the number of
strategic freedoms the combined institutions, considered as formalized strategic games, present to
traders, the constraints they impose, and the symmetry with which those constraints are applied
to the traders. We pay particular attention to what is required to make these \strategic market
games" well-dened, and to make various solutions computable by the agents within the bounds on
information and control they are assumed to have. As an application of these criteria, we present a
complete taxonomy of the minimal one-period exchange economies with symmetric information and
inside money. A natural hierarchy of market forms is observed to emerge, in which institutionally
simpler markets are often found to be more suitable to fewer and less-diversied traders, while the
institutionally richer markets only become functional as the size and diversity of their users gets
large.
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I. INTRODUCTION: A FOUNDATION FOR
ANALYSIS OF MARKETS
The empirical diversity of markets, and the nancial
and legal institutions that support them, lends itself to
two types of analysis. The rst is essentially descrip-
tive and frequently historical, aiming at an account of
the detailed structure and operation of the many instru-
ments and institutions in any real market system. The
second could be called \causal", aiming to explain how
dierently-structured markets compare to each other in
abstract function, and how a functional distinction may
lead to preference for certain specic institutional struc-
tures.
Nothing mysterious is intended here by the term \ab-
stract function". One long-range goal of a causal theory
of markets should be to determine whether denite insti-
tutional structures can be sensibly selected and sustained
according to what they enable people to do from day to
day, somewhat independently of the particular histories
through which any given instance may have come about.
Since the operation of real markets is complex, and the
diversity among their histories enormous, it is a nontriv-
ial matter to separate those details that may be history
dependent from those that could not be otherwise and
still allow the surrounding society to function as it does.
This paper and its companion [1] provide a set of fun-
damental criteria for generalizing the function of mar-
kets, and a taxonomy based on it that includes all of the
distinguishable forms of one-period exchange with inside
money [2].
The function of markets can be generalized in many
domains and at many levels. The physical existence of
marketplaces, and the eects of physical structure on
costs and time eciency, are important and must be
quantitatively analyzed at some stage. However, it is
the informational structure of markets that is most eas-
ily categorized prior to specifying the larger context of
social life, and the one that will be of concern here. Mar-
kets and their supporting institutions dene algorithms
for distributed computation and realization of resource
re-allocations, by agents with limited spheres of control
and often of knowledge. The most basic criteria for the
informational categorization of all markets involve the
choices of actions they oer to agents, the constraints
they impose to allow the agents to arrive at consistent
and agreeable allocations, and the symmetry with which
agents are subjected to those constraints. Classication
according to these serves as a foundation on which ner
distinctions may be drawn, or other domains of function
projected.
The real rules of bidding and exchange, which may
make realizable markets nonequivalent, are often obvi-
ated by the assumptions of general equilibrium theory.
The non-cooperative equilibria of nite, playable market
games [3] are generally not the same as the competitive
equilibria in the same systems, due to the strategic con-
siderations agents have about the eects of their own
actions on prices. Markets that remove subsets of such
actions from agents' strategy sets can dier from those
where the strategies remain, in the agents' computations
of optimality and ultimately in their nal allocations.
This distinction is completely lost in the general equi-
librium representation of agents as price takers.2
As a corollary of the absence of price impacts in the
competitive equilibrium concept, the possibility that dif-
ferent markets may impose the constraints of consistency
asymmetrically on agents is also overlooked. Agents who
are permitted by the market's \rules of the game" to ex-
ert control on prices have qualitatively dierent strategic
freedoms than those who are not, and these can lead to
biased outcomes even under conditions not warranted by
their initial allocations or preferences. This considera-
tion becomes important in assessing the relative value of
using a commodity as money versus a non-consumable
nancial instrument. Thus the concept of Pareto opti-
mality in the context of price-taking is a good beginning
notion of the quality of solutions a market makes avail-
able, but it leaves many important distinctions among
realizable markets unaddressed.
The goal of these two papers [1] is twofold. It is rst
to present a principled set of criteria for grouping mar-
kets and generalizing their functions, and an associated
approach to instantiating the distinctions with minimal
representative models. It is second to dene a notion
of causality, whereby a given institutional structure may
be recognized as necessary to achieve allocations with
specied properties of symmetry, feasibility, or robust-
ness under constraints that may befall agents' endow-
ments. The position will be adopted that markets must
be represented as playable games, and that the denition
of market function must be separated from the choice of
agents' initial conditions and also from their denitions
of what constitute acceptable solutions.
Three concepts { dimensionality, counting of strategic
freedoms and constraints, and symmetry { will be argued
in Sec. II to be the foundation for an informational theory
of markets, and for the use of models to derive its claims.
Dimensional analysis, though not new to economics [4]
will be very briey reviewed as the conceptual tool re-
quiring nontrivial minimal structures. The indexing of
freedoms will then be extended into a more general con-
cept of simplicity and complexity within the constraints
forced by dimensioning. Symmetry (considered in Gen-
eral Equilibrium Theory mostly through the dubious de-
vice of social welfare utilities) will then be shown to be
the next most fundamental concept after dimensions and
degrees of freedom, in qualitatively distinguishing mar-
kets as strategic games. Using test utilities to categorize
market rules by symmetry appears on the surface only
subtly dierent from assigning a meaning to the exchange
symmetry of the utilities themselves. However, a symme-
try of the rules remains a well-dened property at general
agent specication, and so may be discussed apart from
the question of how agents can or should be compared.
It also respects better the spirit of welfare analysis in
economics, which is not to declare that people are in-
terchangeable, but to determine whether markets inict
unnecessary or counterproductive biases on them.
The conventions used in this paper for generating min-
imal models according the the proposed categorization
will then be given in Sec. III, and a short treatment
of the associated natural measure of allocative eciency
given in Sec. IV. These are then followed by a list of the
market structures in Sec. V. The examples will extend
only through one-period exchange, with payment in cash
or credit. Fiat money will not be considered here, be-
cause the additional function it bestowes is rst dened
in the context of multiperiod models, or with more ex-
plicit treatment of trust and its role in boundedly rational
solution concepts.
II. THE ROLE OF MODELING IN ANALYSIS
AND INTERPRETATION
A theory of money and markets must ultimately draw
its validation from predictive, quantitative models. How-
ever, it is an error to equate the notion of theory with
nothing more than a particular model or class of models.
An even greater fallacy is to assign signicance to models
which happen to be numeric, if one has not rst taken
care to show that the standards of measurement den-
ing the numbers are relevant to the economic phenomena
described.
To present a taxonomy of markets here that cannot be
taken for just a collection of ad hoc models, it is neces-
sary to introduce standards of logical necessity and min-
imality. Under these, the collection of models becomes a
theory in a larger sense than just a set of examples.
The rst step in dening both simplicity and necessity
is to require that real markets, which may dier in their
instantiation, be categorizable according to the types of
allocations they make accessible to agents with specied
control, knowledge, and preferences. Such categorization
may be performed at many levels of renement; here the
counting of agents' degrees of strategic freedom and the
symmetry of their nal allocations will be used.
The second step is to be specic about the criteria by
which one good is substitutable for another to the agents
or institutions, and to recognize that ideal substitutabil-
ity (or fungibility, formalized in the notion of dimension-
ality) places constraints on the forms of prices, market-
clearing rules, and legal actions. These constraints imply
necessary minimal levels of structure and dierentiation.
Once the resulting category criteria are known, one
must rene these to criteria of simplicity within cat-
egories, according to temporal dependence, common
knowledge, preference, and rationality. By these criteria,
there will be a hierarchy of models within a given cate-
gory. The simplest model within a category then serves
as a minimal, or \most generic" form that generates the
function of the category, and the least that can be as-
sumed in order to produce that function. In comparing
any aspect of function, features separating the simplest
models in the compared categories may be recognized
as \necessary" to the distinction between them. If the
models are hierarchical, in the sense that one contains a
superset of the institutions in the other, then minimality
ensures that every institution added by the larger cate-3
gory is indispensable if the extra functionality associated
with it is to be achieved.
It is important to note, however, that the taxonomy
of function is not generally hierarchical in any obvious
way. There can be functions provided by institutionally
more specialized market systems that are not provided
by the less specialized ones, but other functions of which
the converse is true.
Because the dening constraints on the minimal mod-
els within any category are induced by dimensionality
and strategic freedom, more complex models within the
category can only dier from the minimal cases by the
addition of either structures or parameters that are not
required by the categorization. Since the categorization
is what elevates the set of its minimal models to an in-
terpretive theory, one can avoid mistaking all the other
possible structure in non-minimal models as being \the-
oretically" motivated. If one then wishes to account for
their empirical existence as more than frozen accidents
of history, that requires a renement of the functional
categorization, which can produce those features in its
minimal representations.
This approach to analysis could be called \eective
market theory", by association with the same mode of
analysis in physics. The physical version, called \eec-
tive eld theory" [5], removed a long-standing mystery
about why models of fundamental processes were found
to work. It showed that, for every process identied by
its symmetries and degrees of freedom, there was a min-
imally complex mathematical model instantiating those
properties, whose features could properly be understood
as causing that process.
A. The necessary constraints on minimal models
The minimal structure a market system can have is
one that recognizes all of the distinctions among types of
goods acted on in a rationalizable way by the collection
of agents. (Alternatively put, the structure of the market
determines which distinctions are oered to the agents to
act on strategically.)
Dimensions: Ultimately it is the imposition of criteria
of fungibility that determines what is to be indistinguish-
able from what else, and there can be considerable free-
dom in choosing these. However, once they are chosen,
it is adherence to them that makes the antecedents of
economic numbers (objects in the world) into quantities
that can be sensibly added, subtracted, and so forth.
The idea of fungibility is captured in the concept of
a dimension. It may be that one bushel of corn at a
particular time and place can be substituted in essen-
tially all respects for another like bushel at the same
time and place, while corn cannot be substituted in all
respects for a paper dollar, since the dollar is not good
to eat, and perhaps the corn cannot be used in exchange
at some markets. The category of things thus fungible
by some specied set of criteria is said to dene a dimen-
sion. Equations must be homogeneous in dimension to
even admit of making sense [4].
Degrees of freedom: The criterion of strategic freedom
is captured in the set of decision variables that the rules
of the game allow agents to choose. Each such variable is
called a degree of freedom, and the number of these may
be counted. Constraints that restrict decision variables
to include open intervals do not change the number of
the degrees of freedom in a system, but those that re-
strict them to points do, and must be countable as some
denite negative number of degrees of freedom.
Symmetry: We will choose to require that market func-
tion be specied and well-dened, prior to commitment
to allocations for the participants, or to a solution con-
cept for them. However, in cases where the allocations
or solution concepts may be preserved under some per-
mutation of the agents, there arises a discrete symmetry
in the description of their state prior to their interaction
with the trade and nancial apparatus. It then becomes
a sensible (and relevant) question, whether a given mar-
ket structure has the exibility to produce solutions that
have the full symmetry of the initial conditions.
Careful use of dimensions will imply nontrivial minimal
levels of structure for prices and market-clearing rules,
and the requirement for models capable of distinguishing
symmetries of inputs and outcomes will motivate mini-
mal forms for allocations and utilities in a subset of cases.
When a complexity hierarchy is chosen, particular mini-
mal forms will be selected as those whose only content is
that required by the dimensions and symmetry, and these
will in general be unique. Models that are more complex
than the minimal forms will necessarily require addition
of either dimensional factors beyond those required to
dene the functions of trade or clearing, or additional
nondimensional constants that are not simply unity.
B. Complexity hierarchy for information and
clearing rules
Without digressing into a formal denition of the com-
plexity of algorithms, it is sucient for a theory of mar-
kets to commit to any denite and reasonable ordering,
by which one algorithm will be called more or less com-
plex than another. We will use the following rules:
 Simultaneous actions are simpler than serial ac-
tions.
 Fewer decision variables for agents in their interac-
tions with markets are simpler than more variables.
The fewest nontrivial variables is one per agent-
market pairing, and it is natural to make this a
choice of a bid for goods. Markets at this level, to
be nontrivial, must require that agents put their4
entire initial allocations up for sale, removing the
choice of how much to oer. Such cases, called \sell-
all" markets, are treated thoroughly in Ref. [6], and
will not be reconsidered here.
The next simplest structure creates two variables
per agent-market pairing, and it is natural to make
these bids and amounts of supply. These markets
include the sell-all case, and allow a broader and
more interesting set of possible means of payment.
The examples in the following taxonomy will all be
of this type.
The next simplest market structure admits four de-
cision variables, which may be taken as bids and
quantities oered, and prices for these whose con-
straining function must be specied. At this level
of complexity, though, the simplest clearing mech-
anism not overconstrained by these inputs involves
contingency and rules to handle incomplete clearing
of bids and oers. These imply a qualitatively more
complex class of games, which will not be treated
here. (Examples in each of these categories have
been treated in Ref. [2], and references therein.)
 Within the realm of solution concepts, non-
cooperative concepts are simpler than cooperative
ones.
 Finally, among non-cooperative solution algo-
rithms, pure-strategy Nash equilibria with maxi-
mal possible knowledge of other-agent utilities and
endowments are the simplest possible. While the
mechanics of the computation may be more in-
volved than that for more knowledge-local algo-
rithms, the full-knowledge Nash equilibrium is the-
oretically simpler than a bounded-rationality con-
cept, because it does not require the additional dis-
tinction between what is shared and what is local
knowledge.
C. Separating games, situations, and solution
concepts
It is natural, in representing markets as games in
strategic form, to discipline the building of models by
enforcing a strict separation of the three essential con-
cepts of game specication, agent situation, and solution
concept. Here, the three stages will also be given a pri-
oritization:
1. The agent strategy sets, the rules for price forma-
tion, and their eect on allocations, must be speci-
ed without regard to the initial conditions aect-
ing the agents who play the game, or the solution
concept by which they choose strategies.
2. Once a market is specied in this way, the situa-
tions of agents, such as initial allocations or con-
straints on cash, must be specied without regard
to the solution concept assumed for the agents, or
how it will constrain the solutions.
3. A solution concept must contain a complete spec-
ication of what each agent wants and what he
knows, about himself and possibly other agents in-
teracting with the markets. For a market to gen-
erate a solution, it must be possible for all of the
agents to compute their solution strategies within
the bounds of their knowledge.
Enforcing this separation will make clear that the func-
tion of markets is to put the computation of consistent
allocation decisions within reach of agents who have lim-
ited spheres of control (and more generally of knowledge).
Even under conditions of the most rationality sensibly de-
nable, some market structures will make more solutions
computable than others.
The prioritization chosen here is not the only one that
could be used. We emphasize it because it will some-
times be the case that, in markets that do not generally
make solutions computable, some ne-tuning of the rules
of the game (say, its bankruptcy penalties or a credit sup-
ply) in explicit relation to agent utility scales would solve
the problem. This kind of ne-tuning violates the whole
point, though, that markets are supposed to be aggregat-
ing devices specied more generally than any instance or
subset of the population they serve. It is therefore in-
appropriate to the kind of theory sought here, and this
hierarchy oers a clean way to rule it out.
D. Computability
In general equilibrium theory, prices are a pure ac-
counting tool, and their normalization is arbitrary. While
there is thus no way to determine absolute price scale, it
also has no eect on the denition of competitive equilib-
rium; all information about the equilibria is resident in
agents' preferences and endowments, and the Walrasian
denition of wealth preservation. Even in this very spe-
cial case, when the dynamics of attaining equilibrium
are considered, algorithms proven to nd some equilib-
rium cannot in general nd all equilibria, or select among
them.
Common knowledge of preferences and endowments is
part of complete specication of the strategic form of
market games, and like competitive equilibria, their non-
cooperative solutions will in general be indeterminate [7].
One form of indeterminacy in some of the one-period
models arises from the inability of the noncooperative
solution concept to specify a unique degree of wash sales.
NE exist at all such degrees, and yet the best response
of each agent requires as input the degrees of wash sales
engaged in by all others. Such forms of indeterminacy
most closely resemble those of CE (though here they can
be continuous rather than discrete), in that they do not
involve the overall scale of prices, and merely reect an5
incompleteness in the specication of the solution con-
cept by the endowments and preferences.
In market games, though, assumptions about the scale
of prices become a nontrivial part of agents' strategic
choices, and are not included in the common knowledge
of the game specication. While the overall scale of prices
remains unimportant as in general equilibrium, in mar-
ket games the ability of agents to coordinate the scales
they use in bidding is essential to arriving at any NE.
When independent price scale assumptions can be hid-
den within agent strategy sets, this induces a severe form
of indeterminacy not present in general equilibrium the-
ory. Resolving the indeterminacy within the one-period
context is one of the major driving forces behind the
credit-evaluating institutions derived here. Explaining
the function of these institutions is another way in which
the process orientation of the game description of markets
exposes qualitative omissions in the perfect-competition
idealization.
III. CONVENTIONS FOR REPRESENTING
MARKET STRUCTURES
To apply any of these principles quantitatively, of
course, one must actually build models, and this requires
conventions and notation. We will use the framework
standard for strategic market games [3], assuming prim-
itive notions of agents with strategy sets, consumable
goods of which they have initial and nal allocations
(possibly zero), and preferences represented by ordinal
utilities of the nal allocations. From any cardinaliza-
tion of these (as long as boundary parameters such as
bankruptcy penalties are made suciently large), pure-
strategy Nash equilibria may be computed, in which the
nal allocations do not depend on the cardinalization.[20]
A. Depth of treatment
It is important to appreciate that all of the models
generated as instantiations have more depth and inter-
pretive power than will be developed here. It is not the
goal of this paper to pursue all of the consequences of
each model, and many particular cases have been thor-
oughly treated elsewhere, as is noted below.
Thus, for instance, the importance of constraints on
cash or credit, or how these relate to which commodity
is used to guarantee promissory notes, will not be con-
sidered if they are not so tight as to change the number
of degrees of freedom. Similarly, while there are many
possible relations between the number of distinguishable
goods and the number of distinct or redundant agents
as identied by their preferences, only the minimal com-
binations that express consequences of the symmetry or
asymmetry of rules will be developed.
B. Agents, goods, and allocations
Agents come in a number m of types, with a num-
ber r replicas of each type (replication allows treatment
of those aspects of competition not arising from spe-
cialization). Each agent is indexed by a subscript i 2
(1;:::;mr). It will frequently be convenient to arrange
the replicas serially, so that agent indices i 2 (1;:::;m)
may also be taken to represent types.
Consumable goods also come in m types, for the con-
venience that later each agent type may be made the
sole provider of one good, as an illuminating special
case. Goods are indexed with superscript j 2 (1;:::;m).
(More general cases, in which agent types may be distin-
guished by preferences, yet be sole producers of a com-
mon good, are regarded as hybrid from the simplied
forms shown here.)
Market trade takes place in a single period, oering
each agent a set of strategic choices, and computing from
the collection of values chosen a transformation from ini-
tial to nal allocations of the goods for all agents. The
initial allocation of good j to agent i will be called an
endowment, and denoted a
j
i. The nal allocations result-
ing from interaction with the markets are denoted A
j
i. A
utility for agent i is a function of the nal allocations of







Markets function by aggregating and disaggregating
both consumable goods oered for sale and bids, which
may be consumable or may be essentially nancial in na-
ture. Even nonconsumable bids are goods, in the sense
that they enter and leave the system according to spec-
ied rules, and are preserved in the act of exchange.
However, such goods are distinguished from consumable
goods in conferring no utility on the holder.
If the bids are of a separate type from the consum-
able goods, each agent i is characterized by an additional
\monetary" state variable, with initial value mi (possibly
zero) and nal value Mi.
C. Trading posts, clearing houses, courts, and
credit evaluators
Markets are realized in the form of trading posts, with
a single post receiving all oers of one good to be sold.
Each agent i strategically chooses a set of oer quantities
q
j





i will be imposed.
The trading posts are dened by an algorithm that
clears all bids and oers, and denes a unique price at
each post for all exchanges of its good. The institutional
guarantee of a law of one price distinguishes market trad-
ing from barter, even in cases where independent posts
provide direct exchange of any good for any other.
The unique clearing rule constrained by the dimensions
of price, synchronous strategy choice by each agent with-
out knowledge of other agents' choices, and the absence6












The nal allocation for agent i resulting from trade in












representing delivery of a fraction of the total goods at
post j, proportional to i's fraction of the total bids at
that post. The nal allocation of i's means of payment
is











representing a disbursement from each post of its total
bids, in proportion to i's fraction of its goods delivered.
(In Markets 1 and 2 below, where each good serves both
as commodity sold and means of payment, this rule will
require special denition, though it will take the same
general form.)
In cases where the bids are promissory notes, disburse-
ments may be made at a central clearinghouse, rather
than at the trading posts. In such cases, the clearing
















In addition, a penalty may be assessed, representing
well-dened laws for bankruptcy. For convenience, the
penalty will be evaluated as a direct change of utilities
external to the market
















The penalty constant  formally induces a relation be-
tween market structure and the scale for cardinal agent
utilities, violating the prioritization of model building
stipulated above. Therefore it will only be used here
to dene a boundary for interior solutions, where neither
the magnitude of  nor the cardinal representation of Ui
aects the allocations or ordinal utility. (It is shown in
Ref. [6], that as long as  is suciently harsh to pre-
clude strategic bankruptcy by some limiting agent, such
interior solutions are assured.) The market and clear-
inghouse function remains well dened even for solutions
sampling the magnitude of ; we simply resist assigning
that magnitude a theoretical signicance of the sort the
rest of the results are given.
Courts provide the penalty function (5), in cases where
all clearing of goods and notes happens at the trading
posts. It is unimportant here whether the action of the
clearinghouse is represented as a combination of a pure
clearing activity with a court activity, or the court is rep-
resented as a degenerate clearinghouse with no require-
ment to handle goods.
It will be found that while clearinghouses and courts
may lead agents to \prefer" consistent solutions with-
out bankruptcy, these institutions alone may not place
such solutions within their ability to calculate. This lim-
itation will motivate introducing a degenerate form of
credit evaluation agency as it applies to systems without
exogenous uncertainty. Surprisingly, such an agency has
nontrivial function, though it is intuitively closer to that
of a foreign-exchange pricing body than a risk-assessing
credit evaluator. Nonetheless, from the function that
credit evaluation is designed to enable in general, that
designation will prove the logically proper, if degenerate,
one here.
D. Agent symmetry and the issue of utilities
As we have required the description of markets to de-
compose { into game, situation, and solution concept {
utilities arise only in the last and most contingent part
of specifying the problem. This is good, since utilities
are also the most fragile and debatable part in the rep-
resentation of economic decision making. Even weaker
than the defense of utilities is any abstract comparison
of preferences across agents, as would be assumed in a
social welfare function.
Nonetheless, it is a natural problem in market analysis
to ask what a given market would make possible if agents
were in some sense substitutable, and more defensibly,
if goods and their associations with agents were to be
permuted. A market is somehow qualitatively dierent
(and embeds dierently in larger games), if it prohibits
agents from arriving at symmetric nal states even if in
principle they are the same by some measure, than if it
can generate a symmetric solution for such agents.
The counting of a market's strategic freedoms at gen-
eral allocations requires no special assumptions about
utilities, though as usual if analytic interior solutions are
desired, sucient ranges may be required of the alloca-
tions, and regularities of the utilities [6]. Examining the
capabilities of markets to respect symmetry, however, in-
volves restrictions on both allocations and utilities, for
which it is helpful to choose specic forms. As in the
specication of prices and clearing rules, this can be done
in a most-informative, minimally-complex form.
For permutation of agents, or goods among agents,
to be meaningful, the agents or good distributions must
somehow be distinguishable. For it to distinguish among
markets, it must also imply the permuting of some re-
strictions. Both of these properties arise most simply in
a generalization of Jevons' failure of double coincidence of
wants [8]. The failure occurs when agents' allocation con-
straints remove the ability to place either bids or oers in
markets where the agents would benet from respectively7
buying or selling goods.











i not generally assumed equal, but for convenience
assumed sucient to produce interior solutions in the
markets considered) the case of maximal, and maximally
symmetric, failure of the double-coincidence of wants cor-
responds to the matrix (written for the rst m agents, one
per type, and then replicated r times)
aspec = aI (7)
where I is the m  m identity matrix.
(Eq. (7) is an abuse of notation, since obviously dis-
tinct goods are supposed to have distinct dimensions, and
should not be representable by a common constant. The
abuse is tolerable because the rules of market formation
will be specied at general a
j
i and thus correctly dimen-
sionally constrained. The correct relation of dimensions
to symmetry is obtained by recognizing that the value
of each nal allocation in the utility must be nondimen-
sionalized by some reference quantity, and that it is the
endowment scaled by the utility reference that can be set
to the common, dimensionless, constant a.)
Once agent types have been distinguished in a sym-
metric way by making each type the sole supplier (\spe-
cialist") of one of the goods, maximal symmetry under
agent permutation is attained if all agents share the same
utility function, and if that function values all goods





























the relative price of any two goods j and j0.
The unique form of relative price that is
 Symmetric in all goods
 Constrained by the dimensions of relative price




































The fi may be any monotone, concave functions, and it





i ! 0. The price relation (9) corresponds
as a minimal form, for purposes of sampling market sym-
metry through allocations and utilities, to the price rela-
tion (1), for purposes of enforcing market clearing.
E. Dimensions and operators that act on them
The commonly recognized functions of money are as
num eraire, means of payment, and store of value, de-
scriptions which also apply in dierent combinations to
other nancial goods. From the perspective of symme-
try, the choice of a money can also impose a form of
agent selection or identication, which may or may not
be desirable.
While the store-of-value function of money will not be
explored within one-period models, it will be helpful to
specify the meaning of the other functions more precisely
by listing their dimensions, and introducing two opera-
tors that act on dimensional quantities as representations
of the test for substitutability, and clearing of promissory
notes.
 Each consumable good is given a dimension, and
the name given to the dimension of the jth good
will be gj (think: \apples", \oranges", \pears").
 There will in general be a num eraire, which is a
specic quantity of a specic good (think \one or-
ange"). The num eraire therefore has both quantity
and dimension (in this case, the name of the dimen-
sion is \oranges"). The num eraire will be denoted
N.
 Personal credit takes the form of promissory notes
denominated in the num eraire. Specication of
the game must include dening who may produce
these, when they are to be paid, how they are ex-
changed for the denominated goods, and when or
if they may be destroyed. Promissory notes may
be written by individual agents or institutions like
central banks, and in general these are not substi-
tutable and thus have dierent dimensions. The
name given to the dimension of a promissory note
written by agent i in num eraire N will be Ii (N).
Promissory notes from a central bank will be given
dimension ICB (N).
 The notation [ ] will be used for the operator on
a dimensional quantity that gives the name of its
dimension (example: [\one orange"] = \oranges").
 The notation C ( ) will be used for the clearing op-
erator that maps a promissory note for a good to
an amount of that good. The operator represents
the actions of a clearinghouse, and the need for it
becomes clear once one demands dimensional ho-
mogeneity of equations. As the example, if b
j
i is8















A complete specication of a minimal market may now
be done easily, by listing the dimensions of the bids, of-
fers, and num eraire, and diagrammatically representing
which goods are directly exchangeable for which others.
Only goods, penalties, and the institutional relations be-
tween them require graphical representation, since the
interaction of agents with the institutions is uniformly
applied according to the clearing rules given above, and
an event sequence described in the next subsection.
 A good, whether consumable or nancial, is repre-
sented by a lled dot .
 The penalty variable applied by the courts is an
open circle .
 A trading post that takes in two goods is repre-
sented by a solid line between the dots represent-
ing the goods . The goods may be con-
sumables directly exchanged, or consumables of-
fered and notes used in payment. They may be
specically-assigned roles as bids and oers, or
there may be freedom in this assignment, as in Mar-
ket 2 below. When there is more than one market
between the same two goods, as in Market 1 below,
the specication of which is bid and which oer dis-
tinguishes the posts, in which case the line between
them is made into a directional arrow .
 A clearinghouse relation between goods is a dashed
line between the dots representing the goods
. In all the models built here, one of the
goods will be a promissory note, and the other the
underlying consumable.
 A court relation between a balance of goods and a
penalty assignment is also a dashed line .
The court and the clearinghouse share a linestyle
that is dierent from that of the trading posts,
as the relation to the agents is essentially coercive
within the rules of these games, whereas the market
relation is essentially voluntary.
 A credit-evaluation relation between two forms of
promissory notes is given the same graphical repre-
sentation as a market relation. Since they are both
goods, and the action of the credit evaluator is lin-
ear (involves no threshold relations), it functions
the same way as a dierent type of market with a
dierent clearing rule.
G. The sequence of events and who does what
Markets, clearinghouses and courts, and credit evalu-
ators, all participate in trade with a denite sequence,
which may be stylized by referring to periods of an imag-
ined trading day. Oers and bids are delivered by agents
to the trading posts (markets) \in the morning". If bids
are in promissory notes, and a credit evaluation agency
is used to evaluate their worth, this takes place through
an exchange between the trading posts and the evalu-
ation agency \at noon" (if not, noon is an irrelevant
time). Bought goods and disbursements of payment for
sold goods are delivered from the markets to the agents
\in the afternoon". If bids are in promissory notes, and
these notes must be cleared, an exchange takes place be-
tween the agents and clearinghouses \in the evening",
when promissory notes are returned to their creators, and
if necessary penalties are assessed (if payment is in con-
sumables, evening is an irrelevant time). Agents consume
their nal allocation bundles entirely \at night". Passage
of one day denes one complete period of exchange.
Agent ignorance of each other's strategies is formal-





before going to market in the morning. If bids are in
promissory notes, agents also write these de novo at the
time of determining b
j
i.
The goal of clearinghouses is to exchange promissory
notes, possibly at an exchange rate determined by a
credit evaluator, so as to allow each agent to \buy back"
his own promissory notes by paying with the notes of oth-
ers. Agents are then free to destroy notes of their own
writing at night, together with consuming their nal al-
locations. The rules of the game prohibit agents from
destroying any promissory notes besides their own.
IV. QUANTIFYING ALLOCATIVE
EFFICIENCY
The noncooperative equilibria of all of the one-period
strategic market games will be found to produce nal
allocations that are are non-uniform in goods at aspec
endowments. Those that at least capture the symme-
try of the agents relate to the competitive equilibrium
in the manner shown (for two agents and two goods)







i = a; 8i.) While one measure of the
importance of the symmetry or asymmetry of allocations
is the incentive to veto they could create if these one-
period markets were embedded in an institution-choosing
game, another is the overall eciency of the trading solu-
tions they generate. The goal of an eciency description
should be a monetary value of exchange, in order to de-
termine under what circumstances market structures can
\pay their way" from the functions they make available
to the traders.
The CE is generally considered a standard of eciency














FIG. 1: Edgeworth box construction for two specialist produc-
ers with utilities of the form (10). Hyperbolae are preference
surfaces for agent 1, whose origin is in the lower left corner.
NT identies the initial allocation, which is also the no-trade
solution for the nal allocation. NE(1) and NE(2) are two -
nal allocations as might arise from non-cooperative equilibria
in two dierent market situations (if this pair is replicated
r > 1 times). The dashed line P. S. is the Pareto set, and
PO(1) and PO(2) are points (also Pareto optima) to which a
speculator external to the system could move agent 1 by vol-
untary trading, from the corresponding NE allocations. CE is
the competitive equilibrium for this system. The limit of the
thin dashed hyperbola indicated by the small arrow suggests
a regularization of the speculator's actions from the initial
endowments. In this limit, agent 1 is indierent between his
initial endowment and the origin, in which case the speculator
can extract a. S1 is the prot the speculator would lose from
such external manipulations, if the agents were somehow able
to attain NE(2) by internal trading, instead of NE(1).
timality properties of the Pareto set, and respects the en-
dowments according to a certain (Walrasian) prescription
for accounting. Such a qualitative notion of eciency is
weaker than one would like, however, in a principled the-
ory of markets, by several standards.
First, \eciency" should mean something more than
optimality if it is to deserve a separate name, and in
particular it should indicate how to quantitatively com-
pare general outcomes to each other and to the CE. A
weakness in the nontechnical use of eciency is that it
contains no specication of how it should be quantied.
This results in independent notions of \allocative" and
\informational" eciency, with no sense of whether these
share a name because they should have some relation to
each other. It even permits multiple uses within a single
mode of analyses, since it is unclear whether eciency
should be constructed from an individual or economy-
wide point of reference [9].
Second, even within neoclassical theory, it is well un-
derstood that the CE is not special if agents are allowed
any trading programme, and that in general they can ar-
rive at any point on the contract curve by innite recon-
tracting of innitesimal trades [10]. Thus if the CE is to
be a standard of eciency, some better justication than
arbitrary xation on Walrasian auction as a denition of
\wealth preservation" should be provided. Alternatively,
if the sensible denition of eciency makes no special use
of the CE, that should be made clear by the theory, in
keeping with the approach that it should be possible to
omit anything not \explained" from a minimal instanti-
ation.
Third, since the emphasis on playable games is that
their noncooperative solutions are in general not even
Pareto optima, a measure of allocative eciency is only
useful to the extent that it indexes these. It must do so,
however, in a way that makes no special use of particu-
lar games, or even of the use of games to arrive at nal
allocations.
A. Eciency from economic notions of work
An unambiguous denition of the eciency of out-
comes can be derived from the methodological correspon-
dence of utility theory to physical thermodynamics [11],
where the term has a particular quantitative meaning.
Eciency in physics and engineering (from which the eco-
nomic usage was drawn [12]) refers to the ratio of work
extracted from a system, to an idealized greatest amount
of work extractable in principle. Mapping that usage
into utility theory requires only constructing the poten-
tial functions whose change is the economic equivalent of
\work".
The details of that construction will be carried out
in App. B, but the result is easy to understand for the
aspec endowments and utilities (10) from Fig. 1. A given
allocation, such as a no-trade solution (NT) or a nonco-
operative equilibrium (NE) is less than perfectly ecient
if agents have potential welfare that remains unrealized
at that allocation. A natural measure of the unrealized
welfare for each agent is some bundle of goods that an
external speculator could extract from him by a sequence
of innitesimal trades along his indierence surface from
that allocation (the worst kind of trading sequence he
could voluntarily be induced to accept). If the agent is
left at some point on the contract curve by the specula-
tive extraction of goods, the speculator can then decouple
(for these models), and even if all agents are allowed sub-
sequently to trade internally, by any algorithm, no further
advantageous trade will be possible. Since the price vec-
tor for goods at the nal allocation will be common to all
the agents, it denes (up to a normalization) the value
of the bundle of goods any collection of speculators can
extract together from all the agents.
One then denes the welfare gain of each agent, result-
ing from internal trade, as the value of the goods-bundle10
that he has kept a speculator from extracting, relative
to that extractable from the NT solution. Since in the
aspec case, every agent's endowment is indierent to an
all-zero allocation bundle, from the NT solution a collec-







from the collection of agents (valued according to prices
normalized to pj = 1; 8j on the contract curve). In com-
parison, if the agents traded internally to any point on
the contract curve, by any path, the sum of their nal
allocations would be the entire endowment. Hence their
gains from trade, expressed in money-metric, are rma.
(For each agent this is just the length of the segment of
contract curve from the origin to the Pareto optimum,
obtained by dotting the allocation vector with the nor-
malized price vector.) While this result is immediately
clear for the CE by symmetry, it is also clearly true for
any other Pareto optimum, because relative to the CE








, for each i. Thus we
observe that the CE has no special role in the welfare
denitions relevant to allocative eciency.
The value of a bundle extractable by an external spec-
ulator is the economic equivalent of the physical notion
of work, extracted by a load from a thermal system. The
agents' utility gain in trading to the contract curve is
measured by just the reduction in work they could do on
external speculators (prot they could voluntarily surren-
der). While it is clear that the reduction for any specula-
tor coupled to a single agent will depend on which Pareto
optimum the collection of agents nally reaches, is it also
clear that the reduction in work (speculative prot) from
combined exploitation of all the agents is an invariant.
It is with respect to this invariant shared gain that ef-
ciency may be non-arbitrarily measured. Though it is
a utility gain, because it is expressed in a money-metric
induced by voluntary trade, it sensibly aggregates to a
measure of social welfare. The welfare gain by the agent
shown in Fig. 1, in going from NE(1) to NE(2), is just
the length of the dark segment labeled S1. This quantity
happens also to be the increase in the utility-version of
agent 1's entropy S1 from the transition NE(2) ! NE(1)
(see Ref. [11] for motivation, and App. B for derivation
of this case).
It is natural, then, to dene the eciency  of any al-
location as the ratio of the sum of utility gains by all the
agents from the NT solution, to the gain rma that they
could realize upon trading to the contract curve. This
gives an intrinsic measure to the fraction of the contract
curve for the endowments captured by any other alloca-
tion bundle. It is shown in App. B (though it is nothing






























Clearly  = 0 at the NT solution, and unity anywhere
on the contract curve. The index  will be computed for
each distinct allocation bundle that arises in the analysis
below. While for agent-symmetric solutions the result
will be unsurprising (that allocations further from the
contract curve are less ecient), this index also provides
a way to compare these results with the more complex
agent-nonsymmetric solutions produced by some forms
of commodity money.
V. THE ONE-PERIOD SIMPLE-MARKET
TAXONOMY



















g1      . . .       gm-1
gm
m(m   1) markets. Payment in goods; no
short sales, no credit. NE computable, sym-
metric, and robust to allocation constraints.
This is the market structure minimally distinguished
from barter, by enforcing a law of one price. Direct-
exchange trading posts exist between all commodities j
and k, and are indexed superscript jk. Oers q
jk
i in these
markets are thus of dimension gj and bids of dimension
gk. Each commodity serves as means of payment in m 
1 markets, and is oered for sale in m   1 others. No












i, for all agents i and all goods j.
At general endowments agen, each agent i has









Markets accepting bids and oers in the same quantity
(would-be self-loops in the diagram) are not considered,
because the only sensible clearing rule would simply re-
turn to each agent what he had delivered. The total
number of strategic DOF for all m agents is therefore
2m2 (m   1).
The price for the jk market is dened by the notational










and is not forced by the institutional structure to satisfy
the dimensionally allowed relation pjk = 1=pkj, though
some solution concepts may lead to solutions with this
property. The allocation rule for agent i as a result of




























Since bids are consumables, there are no separate mon-
etary state variables, and each good changes as a sold
item and a money.
Note that failure of the double coincidence of





in the (m   1) markets for his endowed good,






in markets for other goods,
for which the endowment is used as means of payment.
The resulting total number of DOF is 2m(m   1), and
the system leads to symmetric exchange solutions for spe-
cialists, which are computable at any m, as derived in
App. A1. The eciency of these allocations is less than
unity, but by the smallest margin the one-period non-
cooperative solutions can achieve.
Market 1 is thus agent-permutation symmetric and ro-
bust in allowing nonzero-trade solutions under allocation
constraints. If the costs of operating trading posts were
considered, though, it would also be the most costly of
the structures considered here at large m, because the
costs to maintain m(m   1) trading posts must be paid,
even if agents can only use 2m(m   1) of the degrees of
freedom they provide.



















g1      . . .       gm-1
gm
m(m   1)=2 markets. Payment in goods; no
short sales, no credit. NE computable, sym-
metric, but limited by allocation constraints
for m  3.
This market allows all-for-all exchange, like Market 1,
but reduces the number of trading posts needed in a nat-
ural way. Markets are again indexed superscript jk, but
there is now a unique trading post for direct exchange of
any pair of goods.
The cost of this simplication is that bids and oers,
rather than having separate roles in every market, be-
come dened by context. All goods of type j delivered
to post jk are interpreted as q-values, and all goods of
type k at that post are interpreted as b-values. Since the
name jk or kj of the post is arbitrary within this conven-




i . At general en-









in the symmetrized mar-
kets, and the total number of DOF is m2 (m   1).
Price is computed just as in Eq. (12), with the context-
dependent denition of the bs and qs, but now by deni-
tion pjk  1=pkj. There is a natural modication of the
disaggregation rules for both goods, from Equations (2)
and (3): each agent gets a fraction of the total both of
the j and the k good, equal to his contribution to the
value at the jk post, (which may be measured relative









































and the allocation rules that follow from it (written with



















































In the rst line of Eq. (15) good j is treated as the bought
and sold consumable, while in the second line it is re-
garded as the means of payment for the other k 6= j





i ), the order of jk is permuted in order to
express all quantities as qs, a convenience when maximiz-
ing utilities in App. A.
Under failure of the coincidence of wants aspec, each
agent still has (m   1) DOF for a total of m(m   1)
DOF, because there are precisely (m   1) markets for any
single endowed good in exchange for other goods. The
solutions are still symmetric and computable at all m,
and the collection of markets is half as costly as those in
Market 1, in exchange for oering half the strategic free-
doms. However, the clearing rule leads to large fractions
of returned goods, so if there is no short sale, for m  3
there is a shortage of either oers or means of payment
to attain the interior solution. This is demonstrated in
App. A2. Thus agents would be better o spontaneously
breaking the symmetry of solutions in Market 1, and
abandoning one of the two markets for each good, but
continuing to use the conventional clearing rules. While
one might have expected that thinning of the markets in
the directed case would aect nal allocations, this turns
out not to be the case in either the symmetric or fully
broken solutions, since only the replication index aects
the impact assessments.





















gj 8j 6= m; pm undef
g1      . . .       gm-1
gm12
m   1 markets. Payment in a preselected
good; no short sales, no credit. NE com-
putable, but approach the no-trade solution
under allocation constraints.
This structure has m 1 trading posts indexed simply
by the good j 6= m sold at them. Payment is in good m
and, comparable to the exclusion in the previous cases,
there is no market exchanging m for m. At agen there are









for a total of 2m(m   1) DOF. A version of this market
is treated in Ref. [2], ch. 7, where the role of the mth
good as money is given precedence over its consumable
status.
Under failure of the coincidence of wants aspec, the
m   1 agents of type i 6= m are reduced to one oer qi
i






There are thus 2(m   1) total DOF. However, the solu-
tions are highly asymmetric because only one agent type
may bid in the commodity money, leading to solutions
that approach the no-trade allocation at large m. As the
eciency of no-trade is zero, the eciency of the solu-
tions to this game decay as O(1=m).




















gj 8j 6= m; pm undef
g1      . . .       gm-1
gm
Ii(N)
m 1 markets for goods. Payment in promis-
sory notes for a preselected good, with one
clearinghouse for notes and that good. NE
computable at large m and survive under al-
location constraints, but are not symmetric.
This structure has the same asymmetry as Market 3,
but softens the impact of the failure of coincidence of
wants by adding credit in the form of personal promis-
sory notes to deliver the mth good. All notes are given
credit by the market price and allocation mechanisms (1
- 3) at face value, so promissory notes are substitutable
and the various dimensions Ii (N);i 2 1;:::;mr may be
regarded as a single dimension. With the addition of
credit, bankruptcy rules are formally required to handle
the possibility of default in the promissory notes. How-
ever, for the interior solutions which it is the purpose
of credit to make possible, the bankruptcy constraint is
never binding, because there is net ow of good m to all
of the type i 6= m agents, motivated by its consumption
value.
While a \money market" for the mth good is now den-
able, bid with promissory notes in that good, this model
is distinguished by not including it, giving each agent









of 2m(m   1). The allocation rule for the mth good re-















(When this interior solution is impossible because am
i
is too small, the bankruptcy penalties modify Eq. (16),
and induce an endogenous rate of interest, which is the
shadow price of the capacity constraint [2], ch. 6-7.)
The importance of credit is that at aspec, each agent
of type i 6= m is reduced only to m DOF, the qi
i for his






(versus only 1 DOF





that they have in Market 3, for a total of m2  1 DOF in
the system.
Final allocations at aspec, derived in App. A3, while
not converging to the no-trade solution at large m as in
Market 3, are still not symmetric, however. Though at
m ! 1 and r ! 1 they converge to the competitive































CE is the nal allocation (the same here for all
agents and all goods) that would be attained at a com-
petitive equilibrium. At a level of resolution where there
are many goods in the world produced by specialists, but
relatively few truly equivalent producers of any one good
(small r), the agents called on to provide the standard of
value are penalized relative to the rest. Ultimately this
arises because, whereas all other agents have some strate-
gic freedom to impact the prices of their own goods, the
provider of the num eraire loses this freedom. Though he
has reduced purchasing power relative to other agents,
in other respects he eectively becomes a price taker (as
borne out by the symmetry of Aj
m among j, a property of







The reduction in allocative eciency due to the penalty
on type-m agents is not compensated by the slight wind-
fall given to the other types, so the eciency of this Mar-
ket is the lowest of those that retain nite levels of trade
at large m.
The practical relevance of the asymmetry in this Mar-
ket arises if one considers embedding its function into a
larger game involving the agents' choice to become spe-
cialist producers versus generalists, and then embedding
that in the larger game of adopting a market structure as
well. If the rules of the larger games give agents \veto"
power over the adoption of a market structure, the re-
quirement of Market 4 that the money-providers always
be disadvantaged could in plausible games prohibit its
adoption.13
The solutions in this case exist at all m, but are for-
mally uncomputable due to an unspecied degree of wash
sales by each producer. The formal ambiguity occupies
an interval of relative size 1=m in price and nal allo-
cation, though, and so can practically always be placed
below some threshold of severity at large m. In this prac-
tical sense, NE are \computable" in a limit of suciently
many types.






















m markets for goods. Payment in personal
promissory notes for an arbitrary num eraire,
credited at face value, with a court impos-
ing bankruptcy penalties. NE are not com-
putable.
One can attempt to patch up the asymmetry in Mar-
ket 4 by adding a trading post for good m, in eect a
commodity money-market. At this point, since bids for
all goods are in terms of the same set of promissory notes
credited at face value, their denomination, and hence the
num eraire, becomes arbitrary up to its interpretation in
the bankruptcy laws. Thus with the adoption of a money
market the previously-money commodity is reduced to
just another consumable good, at interior solutions.







8j, giving 2m2 total DOF for the system. How-
ever, correct counting of the strategic DOF requires more
careful treatment of the bankruptcy penalty as it applies
to interior solutions.
The min operator in Eq. (5), having undened deriva-
tive at zero argument, is unsuited to evaluating the gra-
dients required by Nash equilibria. The discontinuous
derivative may be regularized for each agent by replacing
Eq. (5) with
Ui ! Ui + iMi (18)
where Mi is dened in Eq. (3), and since there is no
source of initial debts, mi = 0;8i. The discontinuous
derivative is replaced in Eq. (18) with a set fig of Kuhn-
Tucker multipliers, one for each agent i. One represents
bankruptcy as a game between each agent and the courts,









, and the courts try to minimize it with
respect to i. It diers from a simple Kuhn-Tucker con-
straint in that the courts are only permitted the variation
0  i  .
At nonzero values of Mi, the derivative is manifestly
that of Eq. (5), while at Mi = 0, the derivative of the
penalty term with respect to Mi is i. This gradient is set
equal to the gradient of Ui to obtain the rst-order con-
ditions on the nal allocations. Symmetric, interior solu-
tions exist, and in them no agent goes bankrupt, but by





they satisfy exactly Mi = 0;8i, and 0 < i < ;8i.
If the Kuhn-Tucker expression of the min were noth-
ing more than a regularization method for derivatives,
it would say that agents sample all b
j
i values, and then
compare the relative merits of going bankrupt to buy a
little more of good j to that for a little more of good j
0
.
Obviously this is the wrong interpretation for interior val-
ues of i, which are set by the utilities and not the legal
value . Interior values are a device for comparing the
relative prices of all pairs j and j
0
of goods. They thus
represent a strategy evaluation in which bankruptcy is
not considered, and the relative values of the goods are
compared directly. In other words i, like an ordinary
binding Kuhn-Tucker or Lagrange multiplier, is one neg-
ative DOF per agent, leading to  m DOF relative to the
na ve count of 2m2 for the whole system.
2m2   m is still not the correct DOF count for this
system, though, because there is an overall scaling free-




i, where the same
 is applied by all agents. This scaling freedom reects
the arbitrariness of the num eraire familiar in competi-
tive equilibria. It obviously does not aect a strategic
ability of agents to change either allocations or utilities,
so the correct number of total DOF is 2m2   m   1 =
(2m + 1)(m   1). However, this negative strategic de-
gree of freedom is distributed over the agents, with two
consequences. First, showing it explicitly as a constraint
cannot be done within this model, because all constraints
have already been incorporated. Second, more impor-
tant, and an expression of the same fact, it signals that no
selection process exists to arrive at a solution, even given
maximal rationality, if one makes the commonsense re-
striction that rationality should not be dened to include
lucky guessing.
The way to see the uncomputability of solutions is to
recognize that, even knowing everything about all agent
utilities and endowments, there is no way any agent can
know the scale other agents will use for all of their b
j
i,
because he cannot know their strategies. Since this scale
factor is not constrained by the NE solution itself, there
is nothing knowable outside the strategies that can solve
this dilemma.
Apart from the fact that agents have no way to nd
NE solutions, a continuum of them indexed by the scale
factor  exists, both at agen, and aspec, and in the lat-
ter case they have the symmetry that the allocations of







from each agent's strategies, or m(m   1)
from the total, leaving m2 1. They are the same DOF as
in Market 4 except for two: Agent m can now oer qm
m in
a market for his endowment, but this localized freedom is14
oset by the distributed constraint that overall rescaling
by  has no consequences for interior outcomes.























m markets for goods. Initial payment in
personal promissory notes for an arbitrary
num eraire, exchanged at a credit evaluator
for central-bank promissory notes, at a com-
puted rate of exchange. NE computable at
large m, symmetric, and robust under alloca-
tion constraints.
Market 5 attempted to recover symmetry and intro-
duced a new, severe form of uncomputability. The reason
for this failure is that it replaced a localized constraint
on agents of type m in Market 4, with a global scal-
ing symmetry that was under the control of no-one, and
not deducible by anyone. The institution that retains
symmetry while restoring computability is eectively an
exchange-rate service, here considered as one function of
a Central Bank. (In Ref. [14], exactly the process used
here was modeled, but rather than considering exchange-
rate computation to dene a new institution, Sorin de-
scribed it as a modication to the clearing rule of the
posts, which were then necessarily regarded together as
a single centralized trading mechanism.)
Agents again oer and bid in the mornings at markets
for all m goods, in q
j
i and personal promissory notes,
and as before, the denomination of the notes is arbitrary.
Now, though, the personal notes are not evaluated at face
value, so the markets do not deliver goods or disburse-
ments right away. Rather, they bring the notes along






to a Central Bank,
which computes a set of exchange rates i, and returns
Central-Bank promissory notes on behalf of i to the trad-






which notes become the eective deposit by agent i at





It is clear that with notes not credited at face value, the
b
j
i at dierent i are no longer directly interchangeable,
and must be regarded as separate goods with distinct
dimensions, as in the Market 6 diagram.
Equations (1 - 3) are then evaluated by the markets
in the afternoon, as before, but with the bids for each





. Disbursements of Central-Bank notes to the
agents are made, and the Central Bank takes the agents
to a clearinghouse in the evening, where promissory notes
are exchanged back to their originators at the rates i
dened earlier in the day.
The rule that the Central Bank uses to compute the
i is that all promissory notes will clear exactly at the
end of the day, Mi = 0;8i, so that there is no need for

















. Assembling the constraints and the s into









0] = [0] (21)












































is degenerate, and so has at least one eigen-
vector [i
0] of zero eigenvalue. (If there is more than
one null eigenvector, this indicates that the bids and of-
fers allow the market to break up into more than one
independently-valued subsystems of exchange.)







sistent with an interior NE, up to a uniform but indepen-
dent rescaling by each agent i, to the NE with a single
consistent scale factor. Since [i
0] is a null eigenvector, its
overall scale is of course undetermined, and this is equiv-
alent, up to notation, with precisely the ambiguity of the
num eraire common to competitive equilibria. The Bank
may choose any convention it likes to make the computa-
tion of [i
0] procedurally well-dened, but nothing about
the nal allocations depends on this choice. Note that the
Central Bank is not required to compute a general equi-
librium solution, like a Walrasian auctioneer, and that
the much simpler, linear note-clearing condition (21) re-
mains exact whether or not agents' bids are consistent
with a NE.
The agents' strategies are now well-dened, and the
NE are computable within the context of Nash optimiza-















assumed num eraire and scale, and as if all promissory
notes were to be credited at face value. In general, of
course, the scales assumed by dierent agents will have
no relation, but because each agent's bids will have the
correct ratios internally, the scale scale factors chosen
will not matter.






, xed in Market 5 by the
Kuhn-Tucker multiplier but restored as a bidding free-
dom in Market 6, is not a new degree of freedom, because
it is xed by the clearing rule (21) scally, rather than
by threat from the courts. Thus one DOF per agent has
been added and subtracted, and in this respect the the
markets are the same. The only new feature in Market 6
is that the previously untraceable strategic symmetry,
the overall scale, is now explicitly xed by any choice of
normalization made by the Central Bank, which can be
counted as the required  1 DOF. The counting of DOF
in both the agen, and aspec is thus the same as argued in
Market 5. Further, all of the NE are the same, and the
only consequence of the institutional dierence is to make
them computable within a sensible rationality concept,
without requiring that this extend to include impossibly
lucky guessing. In particular, though, this means that
the solutions retain an uncomputability of the degree of
wash sales, which is only removed practically { that is,
restricted to price and allocations consequences in an in-
terval of order 1=m { in the large-m limit. Calculations
showing that the solutions achieved by this market are
the same as those in the all-for-all markets are provided
in App. A4.
A. Foreign exchange or credit evaluation?
The evaluation service institutionalized here in a Cen-
tral Bank has two interpretations, both correct, but both
specializations of dierent general concepts. One could
be called Foreign Exchange evaluation, and the other
credit evaluation. Both interpretations are forms of mon-
etization of personal credit, which generalizes in a dier-
ent way when issues of trust and visibility are introduced
to solution concepts to compensate for incomplete ratio-
nality or information.
In Market 6, every agent eectively produces his own
currency. The exchange rate evaluation occurs as if each
were a country bringing goods and otherwise-valueless
notes for trade to a set of international markets. The
real goods oered and bid for, together with the distri-
bution of the currency, can be used by a \world bank"
to determine exchange rates, at which no country is left
holding another country's valueless notes at the end of
the period. Values of real goods oered play an essential
part in the relative valuation of currencies.
Alternatively, exchange rate evaluation makes sense as
a form of credit evaluation in the absence of exogenous
uncertainty, and it is under this logical heading that it
is more usefully generalized. The function of credit eval-
uation in the monetization of credit is to exchange un-
reliable notes for reliable ones, at a rate that precludes
only some preventable defaults, in exchange for enabling
trades that would not be possible with cash payment
alone [15]. When default can result from exogenous un-
certainty in the world, as well as strategically, this trade-
o is nontrivial and depends on some marginal valuation
of more trade versus more default.
With or without uncertainty about the world, there
can also be endogenous uncertainty about consistency
of agent strategies, as arises in Market 5 from the un-
computability of a uniquely dened scale factor for b
j
i at
dierent i. The purely endogenous component is special,
though, in that it is entirely preventable with no sacrice
in trade, because it requires only a coordination mech-
anism. The mechanism for removing default solutions
is the same for both forms of uncertainty { the imposi-
tion of exchange rates between personally- and centrally-
generated credit { but whereas this exchange rate gener-
ates an interest rate to balance default under exogenous
uncertainty, it reduces to a pure accounting tool in the
cases here, because complete repayment is always possi-
ble.
B. The gauge structure of monetized credit
The relation of Markets 5 and 6 happens to be precisely
that between two well-understood classes of dynamical
freedom in physics. As shown elsewhere [11] in the con-
text of competitive equilibria, the constrained maximiza-
tion of utilities corresponds mathematically to the prob-
lem of identifying the energetically and probabilistically
preferred state of a macroscopic physical system (in this
case, at zero temperature, where it is call the \ground
state") by minimization of certain thermodynamic poten-
tials. It is a theorem in physics that, when the underlying
micro-dynamics of a physical system possesses a contin-
uous symmetry that any single ground state is unable to
express, there must be a continuous set of such states, de-
generate under the thermodynamic potentials. The im-
possibility of distinguishing one such state from another
by its thermodynamic properties corresponds to the im-
possibility of selecting a preferred equilibrium based on
utilities.
The interesting physical content of such undeter-
minable cases is that the propagation of the microscop-
ically dened symmetries, from the local dynamics to a
relation among global states, may be done in two ways.
If only the global symmetry exists, the problem of coor-
dination among the local elements to nd a single ground
state can only be carried out by dynamics. The excita-
tions propagating this information are known as Gold-
stone particles, and the problem of identifying a scale
for prices from the dynamics of expectations has already
been formulated as one of exchanging these particles [16].
The consequence of this fact for one-period models is16
that, if no time elapses to make dynamics denable, the
coherent best solution cannot be formed, as has been
shown in Market 5.
A physically dierent origin for symmetric ground
states arises from what is called gauge symmetry. A
gauge eld is a globally-dened excitation whose value
serves as a reference for the scale of each of the locally
dened symmetry transformations.
Gauge elds create a new class of local symmetries,
which consist of changing the \gauged" value of the
local variable, while adjusting the reference value (the
\gauge") of the eld together with it to indicate no
change in the actual physical state. In the example of






i; 8j at some i (25)




which any agent is free to induce independently of what
the others do. This leads to no change in the physical
outcomes of the market activities, and in a market where
the NE bids were computable from the utilities, like Mar-
ket 4, creating an additional layer of paper in this form
would be a pointless thing to do. The addition of the
local rescaling symmetry is accompanied by a set of rules
for determining the gauge, here the constraints (21), so
the total number of DOF in the system, and its symme-
try, is preserved.
Gauge elds become nontrivial when, as here, there
is a global symmetry of the ground states that can be
absorbed as one of the physically consequenceless degrees
of freedom in the gauge variation. Then the remaining,
physically meaningful values of the ground state DOF
can be specied instantaneously and in a symmetric way
by the gauge conditions, as was done in Market 6.
It is important to appreciate that a physical theory
with gauge elds is dierent from one without, in prin-
ciple both in the instantaneous specication of its kine-
matics, or state space, which corresponds to the one-
period models, and in the larger specication of its dy-
namics, which become denable over multiple periods.
The distinction may or may not be visible from the re-
stricted kinematic perspective of the selection of equi-
librium ground states, depending on whether they can
or cannot express the global symmetry that is gauged.
If there is no degeneracy of the one-period NE, as in
Market 4, then the addition of a layer of paper will not
aect either the solution or its Nash computability. If,
on the other hand, the ground states are degenerate due
to the expression of some underlying global symmetry,
the coupling of that symmetry to a gauge eld absorbs
the degeneracy into the gauge freedom, removing it from
the spectrum of uncomputables, and allowing it to be
computed even in a single period. [21]
An interesting issue when one comes to dynamics is
that the evolution of gauge elds (nancial instruments)
and the underlying (commodities) is in general inde-
pendently specied. While one must admit uctuations
about the ground states for this dynamics to have any
consequence, such uctuations are expected when one
weakens ideal rationality to limited information or com-
putational capacity (introduces \trembles" of whatever
sort). Then the multiperiod solution states with nan-
cial instruments can be dierent from those without, even
if under perfect rationality they would be specied to be
the same at every instant.
C. Hybrid cases
The six cases listed here are pure forms, maximally
symmetrized among those goods or agent types that are
not distinguished by some institution. In real economies,
subsets of goods can be connected to each other accord-
ing to dierent paradigms, resulting in a hybrid graph
with elements drawn from more than one pure form.
Historically interesting cases, such as Bimetallism, can
arise in this way, though they also involve considerations
not tractable within the one period context, such as how
durable goods with modest short-term utility-of-holding
can become moneys to mediate exchange of other goods
with shorter lifetimes. Some examples of this type are
discussed in more detail in Ref. [1], but will not be pur-
sued further in this paper, because the interpretive scope
of these calculations is too coarse to resolve what makes
them interesting.
VI. SUMMARY OF DEGREES OF FREEDOM
AND SYMMETRIES OF THE ONE-PERIOD
MARKETS
Table I summarizes the various indices computed for
the six market cases considered in Sec. V. It is notewor-
thy that there are a number of overlaps across columns in
the table as institutions are added or changed, in either
the specialist or generalist allocation situations.
Market 3 and Market 4 have the same DOF at agen,
because this is the case of \enough cash, properly dis-
tributed" [17], in which the additional availability of
credit is irrelevant to the Nash solutions. The models
dier in their robustness against boundary solutions, but
this does not aect the DOF count. It is, however, re-17
Prop.nMkt. 1 2 3 4 5 6
Num. Mkts. m(m   1) m(m   1)=2 m   1 m   1 m m
agen DOF 2m
2 (m   1) m
2 (m   1) 2m(m   1) 2m(m   1) (2m + 1)(m   1) (2m + 1)(m   1)
aspec DOF 2m(m   1) m(m   1) 2(m   1) m
2   1 m
2   1 m
2   1
Sym. Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Comp. any m m < 3 NT large m N/C large m
TABLE I: Summary of the properties of the one-period markets. First line is the number of trading posts, which would be
input for costs if larger institution-choosing games were being considered. Second line is DOF for unconstrained bids and oers;
third line is for the case of specialist producers. Fourth line indicates whether the NE have the same symmetry as the agents
in the specialist case. Last line is computability, where NT means degeneration to the no-trade solution, and N/C means not
computable. Large m denotes a limit not speciable within the setting posed, but dened qualitatively in the solutions of
App. A. The value qualifying as \large" in a larger game would depend on a tradeo between costs of maintaining trading
posts, and either cardinality of the utility or the costs of bankruptcy.
ected in the collapse of the cash market under aspec, as
reected in the reduced DOF.
On the other hand, Markets 4 - 6 are indistinguish-
able for aspec, and indeed all provide nite-trade solu-
tions under allocation constraints. Their dierence is in
the computability of these solutions.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
A. Relations of symmetry to eciency
The one-period exchange mechanisms summarized in
Table I produce three qualitative types of solutions,
which become more ecient as they become more sym-
metric, both under permutation of each individual's
goods, and under permutation of individuals. There is
an intrinsic asymmetry of endowments in the generalized
Jevons failure aspec, while the preferences are assumed
completely symmetric. The eciency of any market sys-
tem considered here turns out to measure how eectively
it erases the endowment asymmetry as a property of the
allocations, and replaces it with the symmetry of the pref-
erences, preferably without introducing any new asym-
metry under permutation of agents. The dierence in ef-
ciency between any two market types, multiplied by the
initial wealth rma of the system, is the money-measure
of utility gain available to pay for any additional institu-
tions required by the more ecient system.
If one assigns the pure no-trade solution as the con-
sequence of strategic uncertainty of Market 5, this solu-
tion has eciency NT  0. Barely better, the severely
allocation-constrained solution of Market 3, in which to-
tal exchange is limited by the endowments of the cash
holders, produce eciencies   1=m. Market 2, for
which symmetric interior solutions are limited by bound-
ary constraints, are a more complex intermediate case in
which eciency should asymptotically approach a limit
associated with trade by half the desired amount at large
m.
In contrast, as soon as credit is introduced, most goods
are traded, and eciencies approach unity at large m
and r. The least imprint of the endowment asymmetry
on the nal allocations is produced by Markets 1 and 6,
which preserve the joint permutation symmetry of agents
together with their endowed goods, and attain the re-
sult (A11):   1 1=2m(r   1)
2 (though the latter does
so only at large m).
When the joint permutation symmetry of agents with
their goods is violated by the institutional structure it-
self, as in Market 4, even though most goods are traded,
the cost is a slightly reduced eciency (A37):  
1 1=2m(r   1)
2  1=2mr2. At large r, the reduction in
welfare of the type-m agents, relative to the others, low-
ers eciencies as much as the entire goods-asymmetry
for all agents combined in Markets 1 or 6.
B. The path from barter to credit evaluation
As eciency gains measure what wealth is available
to pay for institutions that facilitate trade, the multi-
plicity of institutions measures what must be paid for.
If one were to embed this analysis of one-period mar-
kets in larger games, where trading posts have costs of
operation, and the choice to specialize was accompanied
by productive economies of scale, a natural association
of market types with scales of trade could naturally be
made to arise.
For suciently infrequent or specialized trade, there
would probably be only barter, because the cost of sus-
taining even one post per good could not be supported by
the value of variance reduction accrued from a law of one
price. With more trade, but of limited types of goods and
with relatively little redundancy by suppliers, all-for-all
markets could achieve the best noncooperative equilibria
possible, without guessing and at any m. It would not
be necessary for the more centralized credit markets to
have gone undiscovered, in order for them not to exist.
Their non-existence would in a sense be determined by
their inability to make optimal NE computable for small
m.
As scales of trade grow, however, the cost of the all-
for-all trading posts grows quadratically in the number18
of goods, even as the errors from mis-estimation of wash
sales in the credit markets declines. Given any struc-
ture of costs per post and per error, there will be some
scale above which all-for-all markets become unsustain-
able and centralized credit markets dominate.
These conclusions can be qualitatively drawn without
reference to exogenous uncertainty or the other roles of
credit evaluation, money as a surrogate for trust, or the
heterogeneity of volumes and market types that aects
real economies. Under addition of these complicating
factors, the general associations of market-system types
with scales of trade would then serve as an organizing
principle or tendency from which to recognize the devia-
tions induced by combination.
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APPENDIX A: ALLOCATION-CONSTRAINED
SOLUTIONS
Noncooperative equilibria for all of the nontrivial mar-
ket models are computed here at aspec endowments. Only
solutions with the maximal symmetry respected by both
the endowments and markets will be computed. In all
cases considered these exist, but they are unique only
where so noted. No attempt will be made to prove non-
existence of solutions that spontaneously break the sym-
metry of the endowments or markets, though in many
cases, such as replica-asymmetric solutions in the all-
for-all markets, it is elementary to show that these do
not exist as long as preferences are convex and C1-
dierentiable.
Because symmetric allocations are of interest, utilities
will be restricted to the form (10). The cardinalization
functions fi will never matter, and to factor them out of
the optimization equations, it is convenient to introduce




















The arguments of the fi, though, will be objects of
recurring interest, as this is the meaningful function of
consumables that measures the ecacy of markets, both
relatively among users in a single economy, and across
economies. For reference, as both the most symmet-
ric outcome possible, and the one leading to the largest
utility all agents can simultaneously have, the allocation















In the derivations below, other allocations will be com-
pared to the solution (A2), and found at large m to dier
by factors of the form
1 + x
ex < 1; 8x 6= 0; (A3)
where x will be various functions of the replication index.
1. Market 1
The nal allocations are given as a function of the
strategic variable choices by Eq. (13). Varying these,















































The parenthesized factors involving Bjk and Qjk arise
from the agents' own assessment of their impacts on
prices. It it through these factors that the NE dier
from the CE in all cases.
The condition of maximal utility for any agent i follows






































Maximally symmetric solutions permitted by the mar-
kets are those in which all agents oer the same amount
q  qik
i and bid the same amount b  bki
i , for any
i 6= k. The price at any trading post in terms of these is
p  pjk = b=q, for any j 6= k. The only nonzero impact19



























The notation A+ may be introduced for the nal allo-
cation of any agent in terms of his endowed good, and A 
for his nal allocation in any of the non-endowed goods,



















(As noted, the declaration of aspec by the matrix 7 is
bad notation, since dierent goods are supposed to have
dierent dimension, and as such should not be denoted
with the same quantity a. A similar crime is the use of
q to denote agent oers by dierent types. Those abuses
are xed in Eq. (A7), because A+ and A  are properly
nondimensionalized, even if oers and endowments are
given dierent dimensions for each i. The proper def-
inition of the symmetric allocation constraint is really
obtained by setting these nondimensional quantities to
take type-symmetric values, as is done in Eq.( A7).)
The intrinsic symmetry of the endowments, since it
is respected by the market structure, implies that for
symmetric solutions p = 1 ) b = q. Substituted, with









It is exactly solvable and unique for both A+ and A 
at all m > 1, but is useful to expand as a power series









































The cost of this asymmetry of agents, in terms of re-
duction in the allocation product which is the argument
of the utilities, takes a particularly convenient form at































This solution, in this costliest of market structures (in
terms of number of trading posts) turns out to be the best
that one-period exchange among non-cooperating agents
who account for their own price impacts can achieve.
This market and the next are unique, in making this so-
lution computable for any m, a feature that even the in-
stitutionally more complex credit markets will not have.
However, only this market makes the solution accessible
without short selling at nite m  3.
2. Market 2
It is most convenient notationally to use the line from
Eq. (15) for the nal allocations, in which all submissions
are treated as q
jk
i , and the market-index order rather
than a q/b distinction is used to identify which good is





























































Agents can oer only their endowed goods, and for
symmetric solutions, the oers will be the same, allowing
the notation q  qik
i , for any k. This is the same as
the b = q property of the all-for-all-directed market, and20
implies Qkj=Qjk = 1. The oer impact in the second line
of Eq. (A6) is as before, and now includes the bid impact
up to the renaming of bids and oers at a post. The
expressions for nal allocations of the endowed and non-
endowed goods are also much the same, with the only















Again Eq. (A8) follows from maximization, so that the
nal allocations for all i are just Eq. (A9), and the argu-
ment of the utility remains as in Eq. (A10).
It is worth noting that q=2 in this market has the same
value as q +b in Market 1, so nominally each undirected
market is \thicker" than its directed counterpart. The
importance of thickness in this market, though, is that
the best the agents can do under their allocation con-
straints is reach a boundary solution approximating the
NE (often not closely) at m > 3. Combining Eq. (A14)









a fraction greater than one for m  3. More than half
of this, of course, agents have returned to them by the
clearing rule, but by having to put it up in the absence of
credit, the rule has made the optimal solution inaccessi-
ble to them. Market 1, meanwhile, has no such fragility.
3. Market 4
The allocations (2) and (3) nally become simple with
this market, and the notation for total bids and oers








i. The variation of the




















There is also, for the rst time in a nontrivial market, a
separate monetary state variable, in the form of a nal



















Using the bankruptcy-modied utility (5) within a range



































This market structure has the least symmetry of those
considered. It admits a single oer variable q  qi
i, and
as before requires two bid variables: one b+  bi
i for
the endowed good, and another b   b
j6=i;m
i for the non-
endowed non-money good, for any i 6= m. Now, however,
there is a third bidding scale b0  bj6=m
m by the provider
of the mth good, for all other goods, which for him are
not endowed. The total bids on any market may be given
the notation mb  Bj = b+ + (m   2)b  + b0, in terms
of which the price of each non-money good is p  pj =
mb=q, for any j 6= m.
The absence of a trading post for the quantity de-
nominating the promissory notes removes an oer-impact
factor for agents of type m, separating goods into three
categories: endowed, non-endowed, and the commodity
money. It is convenient to dene the nondimensional
variables of the most-symmetric solutions by momentar-
ily letting i be the index of a non-m agent and his en-
dowed good, and j any other non-money index, so that























































































except that now there are three of them, while the alloca-




















The two nontrivial relations arising from Eq. (A18) for




























In terms of these, the allocation product for the agents















As it follows from the denition of p and Equa-













































where the second expansion is appropriate at large m
as long as b+=b;b =b;b0=b  O
 
m0
(as will be demon-
strated momentarily).










which has a unique solution for b0=b , if b+=b ! 0. There
are thus unique solutions with no wash sales, which can
serve as a basis for the analysis of more general NE.
The nal allocation Mm (A22) may also be computed
in terms of the ratio b0=rmb at general b values, as










Plugging this relation into Eq. (A22) for M , the oer
constraint of no short sales q  a implies the bound
0 
b+









Together with the relation (A29), this implies the asymp-
totically m-independent scaling of all components of b
j
i
required to satisfy Eq. (A27).
The nature of the NE parametrized by b+=b is easy to
understand, but implies a new form of uncomputability
for all solutions of this kind. It is clear that, given any
interior NE with b+=b ! 0 (which the above equations
yield), there is a neutral freedom for any single agent i to
engage in wash sales. Because at b+=b ! 0 he as oered
less than all of his endowment (solution is interior in Ai
i),
he may always oer some additional increment of qi
i, and
increase his bi
i, without incurring bankruptcy penalties,
as long as his wash sales do not change the price.
Of course, if other agents knew he were going to thicken
the market, it would change their own impact assess-
ments, and so their bids would not remain the same, by
Eq. (A28). Thus the neutral curve for any agent given
b+=b ! 0 does not coincide at general m with the one-
parameter family of NE obtainable by the group as they
vary b+ collectively. Since any bi
i is subject to a neutral
variation, nothing about the NE condition can x it for
any agent, and so cannot allow him to guess the value
that will be chosen by other agents either.
If one were to alter the solution concept, such as by
ranking the NE globally, the b+=b ! 0 solution would be
the least preferred, an algebraically tedious result, but
one whose origin is easy to understand. The reason the
allocation products of NE are smaller than those of CE
is that suppliers hoard their endowed good to some ex-
tent, because of 1   1=r decrease in the marginal value
of increasing oers, due to price impact. Any allowed
increase in wash selling stabilizes prices to some degree,
placing each agent in a situation slightly closer to that
of a price taker, and so reduces the hoarding tendency
and moves every agent's allocations closer to the sym-
metry of CE. Thus the maximum wash sale possible is
the globally Pareto superior NE. At the same time, any
agent who chooses that outcome is maximally vulnerable
to bankruptcy, with its more severe penalty than a mere
reduction in allocations, and so any other NE is risk-
dominant over the maximal-wash-sale solution. Rather
than pursue the resulting choice among more rened so-
lution concepts for this one structure, we prefer simply to
acknowledge the uncomputability of the standardly de-
ned NE solution with the tools provided by bankruptcy
institutions alone.22
The problem of uncomputability is regulated at large
m by Eq. (A30), because no provider can impact either
the price or the total amount of his own bids at or-
der larger than 1=m, by engaging in wash sales. With
vanishing price impact, the corrections by other agents
also disappear, and so the neutral curve for each agent
independently converges to coincidence with the collec-
tive change of b+ in the NE, implying that both become
strategically null changes. The entire range of NE then
































































Thus, at large m but only there, for each agent it be-
comes rational to engage in any degree of wash sale within
the bounds imposed by the NE, and converging as 1=m,




















the same for agents of type i 6= m as in Markets 1 and 2,
except that in Market 2 the absence of short sales made
this equilibrium unattainable.
Meanwhile, with the same order of convergence, the


























It is indeed smaller than that for the other types by the
factor in Eq. (A27), which is in turn smaller by a factor
of the same basic form (A3) than the CE solution.
The nal allocation from this market is the only one
























and though Eq. (A31) is not evaluated to the order to

















These corrections to the type-i 6= m allocations only
perturb the eciency at O
 
1=m2
, while the order-unity
reduction for type m versus the rest, in Eq. (A34), per-

































The allocations become progressively less ecient as they
become less symmetric.
4. Markets 5 and 6
The NE for both symmetric credit markets are iden-
tical, and it is more direct to compute them for the ele-
mentary Kuhn-Tucker form of the bankruptcy constraint
in Market 5. The solutions will therefore be computed in
that case, without regard for the fact that agents cannot
achieve them due to the scale ambiguity of bids. Since
the rational solution concept in Market 6 is to assume a
shared scale of bidding and continued bankruptcy limits,
the operation is the same, with the scale-factor correc-
tions between dierent agents' solutions merely supplied
by the evaluation agency after the fact.
The variations of allocations and moneys are the same
in Market 5 as Equations (A16-A17), but because the de-
nomination of the promissory notes is now arbitrary rela-
tive to any of the consumables, the bankruptcy multiplier
enters in a meaningful way into the Nash optimization
(interior solutions for the consumables no longer make
the bankruptcy constraint slack). The variation of the












































where the magnitude of the penalty variable  does not




There are now solutions entirely symmetric in the oer
variable q  qi
i, and in terms of only two bid variables
b+  bi
i, b   b
j6=i
i , for any i. The total bids on any
post may be denoted almost as before, mb  Bj = b+ +
(m   1)b , and in that notation p  pj = mb=q, for any
j.
The rst two lines of Eq. (A19), and Eq. (A20), again
describe the only nonzero impact factors, and the nal
allocations A+  Ai
i=a and A   A
j6=i
i =a again take the
form in the rst two lines of Eq. (A21), in terms of the
present denition of mb. The rst equality of Eq. (A23)
remains true, as the only nontrivial relation. In these
markets it denes a unique solution for b+=b ! 0.
To obtain a bound on wash sales, one can introduce






























As before, q=a  1 implies a bound on  at order 1 1=m,




. Thus again, at large m but only there, the
neutral curve of independent wash sales for each agent
converges to the joint curve of b+-parametrized NE, for
which the allocations become degenerate.
To estimate the allocations simply, one observes that





























The allocations (A40), correct to the stated order at all
allowed b+=b, agree with Eq. (A9) and the relevant lines
of Eq. (A31) to those orders, and for all agents i. The
allocation product, and with it the eciency, is thus the
same as the result (A10) produced by the all-for-all mar-
kets, though only as a limit.
APPENDIX B: THE THERMAL POTENTIALS
FOR SPECIALIST TRADERS
The mapping from the potential theory of physical
thermodynamics [18] to a similar potential formulation
of utility theory [11] is based on two quantities: the ex-
penditure function [19] ei (p;Ui) for each agent, and a
dual contour money-metric utility i (xi), dened from
an allocation contour in the Pareto set. In this notation
p is an arbitrary vector of normalized prices, Ui any or-
dinal utility representation for agent i, and xi a vector of
his allocations. There is some freedom in how to assign
these values for the utility problem at aspec, but it does
not aect the outcome of the derivation. The simplest






internal to the system, and impose an arbitrary normal-
ization on prices to assign values to bundles. The main
derivation in the following subsections will be done this
way, and only at the end will a more general \cash valu-
ation" be considered, to show the detailed relation to the
constructions of Ref. [11].
1. The expenditure function and the contour
money-metric utility
Using the utility representation Ui of Eq. (10), and
any normalization convention for prices, the expenditure











is a vector of given prices, and the A
j
i are
Hicksian demands, at which agent i would be in equilib-





i (Ui) is imposed on demands by Eq. (10),


















expressed in a form that is independent of both price
normalization and utility scale.
Where the expenditure function (B1) denes a money-
metric utility relative to a vector of prices and an ordinal
Ui, the dual contour money-metric utility [11] is a func-
tion of demands, and amounts to a particular choice of
cardinalization fi. Because the Pareto set for the sample
cases aspec is characterized by constant prices, the two
forms will coincide on the Pareto optima.








and we may as well adopt any of the number of normaliza-
tions that set these pj = 1; 8j. Just as price components
are equal, by permutation symmetry among the goods,
the \best-exploitation" allocation to which an external









These are points on the Pareto set such as PO
(1) and
PO







to satisfy Eq. (B4), and also be in the




























is then dened as the value of the best-
























The economic work potentials dened in Ref. [11] are
essentially various surpluses, of the expenditure func-
tion (B1) over the contour utility (B6), scaled to some
common reference price.
2. A symmetric value index for measuring wealth
The idea of an intrinsic, monetary welfare measure for
the allocations of an economy is based on the ability of an
external speculator, by oering dierential pricing among
agents, to extract a maximal bundle of goods from them
collectively, after which they will have no more desirable
trades to pursue. To give a money value to the extracted
bundle, there is usually assumed to be a common price for
at least one good, which for convenience is held constant
during the extraction. In general there is more than one
such nal allocation from the point of view of the agents.
To distinguish among them the one that denes the in-
trinsic welfare measure, it is assumed that the speculator
has has no way to value goods other than the one at the
xed price, and so chooses a nal allocation in which he
holds none of those goods.







there is no single relative price that can be held constant
in passing from the endowments to any Pareto optimum,
and still be symmetric among the agents. There is, how-
ever, a natural symmetric bundle of goods, and extract-
ing any maximal amount of it leaves all agents somewhere
within the original Pareto set, where that bundle is val-
ued at the unique price pj = 1; 8j. It is thus natural to
let the Pareto value of the extracted symmetric bundle
be the money measure of welfare even when there is no
common price shared by all agents during its extraction.
This can also be shown formally to be the correct choice
by adding a \cash" market with a shadow price for the
symmetric bundle, but since that increases notation and
adds nothing to the solution, it will only be summarized
briey at the end.
The symmetric bundle for each agent i will be given the




i. With this choice it becomes
clear that the appropriate normalization convention for
prices is
P
j pj = m, so that Ui functions as a num eraire.











p  (1;~ p) for prices and allocations, and performing an
orthogonal transformation on allocations and prices, one
can make the separation























A + ~ p  ~ Ai
= Ui + ~ p  ~ Ai; (B7)
where the last line follows from the normalization of p.
From the denition (B6) and the directionality rela-
tion (B2), it follows that under any dierential change of


















Combining this with Eq. (B7), one gets the conservation
law for Ui in terms of extracted non-num eraire goods




















Eq. (B9) corresponds to the physical conservation of in-
ternal energy for some i'th thermal subsystem in a col-
lection [18]:
Ui =  pVi + TSi; (B10)
where p in physics is pressure, Vi is the subsystem vol-
ume, and pVi is the work done by the subsystem i on
its environment (here the speculator). The economic al-
location Ai generalizes volume to a vector-valued exten-
sive state variable, and p (price) generalizes pressure to
the conjugate vector-valued intensive variable [11]. In





, and Si $ i. These
identications are in fact the same as those made in
Ref. [11] apart from the absence of any exchangeable
\heat" component to the entropy, because for the mo-
ment the agents are not coupled, even formally, to a
source of xed prices.
3. The work potentials of markets
For the reversible legs of the extraction process (the
transformations along indierence surfaces in Fig. 1), the25
prot delivered to the speculator by each agent comes
from Eq. (B9) in the i ! 0 form
Ui =  ~ p   ~ Ai: (B11)
Meanwhile, from any allocation-preserving initial condi-
tion, the total ~ A accumulated by the speculator from tak-




 ~ Ai =





Ui = rma; (B12)
leaving each agent i at the origin, where
Ui (0) = 0: (B13)
(This transformation can be regularized by taking the
limit of transformations along the dashed hyperbola in
Fig. 1. As the initial allocations approach aspec, the spec-
ulator's best-extraction bundle for agent i approaches the
origin.)
When utility does change, it follows from the conser-







~ p   ~ Ai extracted from each agent i equals the
maximum change in the so-called Helmholtz potential





























for either reversible or irreversible changes.
In particular, this applies to comparisons among the
nal Pareto optima at which the speculator could leave
each agent i. Then, T  1, and all  ~ Ai  0, so Ui =





















It is clear that if agents can trade internally to the
contract curve, by whatever means, endowments are pre-










i = rma: (B17)
Thus it is natural to dene the eciency  of any nal
state to which the agents could be brought by a specula-




























This is precisely the ratio of actual \work" denied by
the agents to the speculator, to the best they could do.
Evaluating Eq. (B18) by means of the denition (B6)
then gives the result (11) in the text.
4. Formal use of reservoirs
The inability to hold any nontrivial price xed (mean-
ing, other than the normalization) during an extractive
process can be overcome by formally introducing an ex-
ternal market for some form of \cash". This fullls the
role of the \world market" that assigns values to inter-
nal goods in Ref. [11]. Incorporating such an external
market extends agent i's allocation bundle to include a








, and a xed






i + Mi = Ui + Mi = 0: (B19)
The external money may be considered intrinsically
valueless to the agents, thus not changing the preference
structure we have assumed for them, but still be given
a formal presence in the utility, by assuming the world
market accepts only cash payments, and the agents have
no initial endowments of Mi. The rst constraint implies
Mi  0 always, while the intrinsic valuelessness implies
that agents will never surrender any of the consumable
Ui to acquire a nite stock of it. The two considerations
are satised simultaneously by a utility of the form












where i is now a proper Kuhn-Tucker multiplier, taken
as minimizing Ui on the range [0;1), and the contour
money-metric form (B6) has been used to dene fi to
avoid the step of a later translation.
Prices are identied by varying the utility (B20) ex-
















5 = 0: (B21)
Solving Eq. (B21) gives the marginal utility of Mi, which









The expenditure function becomes







 Mi + Ui + ~ p  ~ Ai; (B23)
and the contour money-metric utility i is simply Ui of
Eq. (B20). The Helmholtz potential has the relation to
ei and i given in Eq. (6) of Ref. [11]:









i   ~ p  ~ Ai; (B24)
in which the terms involving Mi cancel exactly, recover-
ing the form (B14). The entropy is the same function,
but now relates to the contour utility as
















as in Eq. (B23) of Ref. [11]. Nominally, the entropy
can change by exchange Mi without utility change,
apparently at a well-dened price. However, because
agents start with no money and are permitted no credit,
Mi  0; 8i, under all circumstances. The world-market
price  only serves formally to give an M-value to the
good Ui, since in the utilities it has no real function but
to x a Kuhn-Tucker multiplier.
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